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Title: 
 
The intrinsic value of agency: the case of Indonesia 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the relationship between agency and Indonesian women’s well-being. The 
existing debate on empowerment mostly focuses on agency's instrumental value, how agency 
benefits development and household/women's welfare. We depart from this debate by considering 
the intrinsic value of agency for women using the Indonesia Family Life Survey. We measure agency 
based on the decisions women make within their households. We find the effects of agency are not 
unambiguously positive. Agency has intrinsic value, seen in its strong relationship to well-being in 
certain spheres, which is moderated by the 'burden of responsibility' that seems to be felt by 
decision-makers.   
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This paper looks at the effect of women’s agency on their subjective well-being in Indonesia. 
Research, to date, has tended to concentrate on the impact that agency has on the welfare of 
households and families. Studies analysing this instrumental impact of agency show beneficial 
impacts on household welfare (see for instance Abadian, 1996; Adato, Brière, Mindek, & 
Quisumbing, 2003; Agarwal, 1997; Basu, 2006; Blumberg, 1988; de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, & 
Roy, 2014; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1991, 1995; Kabeer, 1994, 1997, 1999; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 
2003), although there is evidence that this is not always the case (see Duflo, 2012 for a summary). In 
this paper, however, we are more concerned with the intrinsic value of agency – the relationship 
that such agency has with the woman’s own subjective well-being. Focusing wholly on the 
instrumental role of agency risks conflating women and their households: benefits to families like 
improvements in children’s welfare can come at the expense of women themselves (Dasgupta, 
2001).  
A significant point in this context is how such agency can be measured. If agency is a person’s 
capacity for action and their ability to identify and act on a goal (Iversen, 2003; Kabeer, 1999; A. Sen, 
1985b, 2001), then the most direct way to measure women’s agency is to consider who makes 
decisions within a household and how these decisions are made. This is the approach we use in this 
paper to analyse the relationship between agency and the subjective well-being of women in 
Indonesia. We study this using data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) which provides 
individual and household level information for 44,103 individuals in 2007.  
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. Firstly, though the impact of agency on 
household welfare has been widely researched, its impact on the subjective well-being of an 
individual is relatively unexplored within the empirical development literature. This is a significant 
omission for a number of reasons. There is a large theoretical literature on the relationship between 
agency and well-being which falls within the capability framework that would argue subjective well-
being is meaningless in the absence of agency. Within the empirical literature, on the other hand, 
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most analysis has concentrated on the impact that agency has on household welfare. To the extent 
that agency is important to a person’s sense of self-worth it might well be considered to influence 
their well-being too. 
Secondly, we measure agency directly by looking at who within the household makes specific 
decisions with relation to children or household expenditure. Most studies to date have tended to 
use proxies in the form of relative education between the spouses, relative age or relative income, 
which measure the woman’s agency, but indirectly. Alternatively, women’s autonomy has been 
studied more directly using measures such as the ability of women to move freely, to work or to not 
suffer domestic violence. Nonetheless, these are still indirect measures as they assume that freedom 
of mobility or of work will also be reflected in women’s ability to allocate household resources, for 
example through household decision-making. This is an assumption that remains untested. In this 
paper, we use direct information not only on who makes decisions within the household but also the 
domains within which each partner has greater dominance.  
Finally, we analyse this issue in the context of Indonesia which is a good case for several reasons. 
The agency enjoyed by women in Indonesia is relatively high compared to most developing countries 
(Bulbeck, 1997; Koning, 2000; Saptari, 2000). Despite this, it varies across groups with a range of 
socio-cultural arrangements – from the matrilineal Minangkabau to the bilateral Javanese to the 
patrilineal Batak. For instance, the Batak and Minangkabau are less likely to make child-related 
decisions jointly than the Javanese. Similarly, the Minangkabau are less likely to make all cash and 
gift-giving decisions jointly than the Batak and the Javanese. These different arrangements provide a 
variability in the agency levels which makes the analysis revealing.1  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly describe the context of 
this study. Then we consider the literature we draw on for our research, namely both well-being and 
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agency. Next we describe our data and methodology before moving onto our results and discussion 
in Sections 4 and 5.   
1. Context 
Indonesia is culturally diverse and is made up of hundreds of ethnic groups (Sakai, 2010; Statistics 
Indonesia & Macro International, 2008) with gender research revealing much heterogeneity in the 
gender roles and norms among the different ethnic groups (Blackburn, 2004). It is also a country in 
which women are frequently said to have relatively more status and agency than South or East Asian 
women (Bulbeck, 1997; Koning, Nolten, Rodenburg, & Saptari, 2000; Saptari, 2000). This, together 
with variation in agency levels across ethnic groups make an analysis of the agency of women and its 
impact on their well-being revealing in Indonesia. Nonetheless, Indonesian women’s agency still 
occurs within the context of gendered social structures and institutions and is further delineated by 
the state which attempts to strictly segment male and female roles in society through the Marriage 
Law. 
The 1974 Marriage Law in Indonesia legally institutionalises the idea of separate spheres in 
household bargaining (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). The Marriage Law defines men as “heads of the 
family” and women as “mothers of the household” (O'Shaughnessy, 2009, p.1) and is often seen as 
constructing women as their husbands’ appendages (Jones, 2002; O'Shaughnessy, 2009). Supporting 
this is the state-driven gender ideology of ‘State Ibuism’ (Suryakusuma, 1996) which frames 
motherhood as central to women’s identity (Dawson, 2007; Tiwon, 1996). The word ‘housewife’ 
became associated with middle class status during the New Order era (Blackwood, 2007). Such 
institutionally driven division of roles has been most effective among civil servants and government 
officials whose performance evaluations are based partly on their wives’ participation in state 
sanctioned women’s organisations (Oey-Gardiner, 2002; Suryakusuma, 1996). Government 
employees are also subject to additional laws regulating marriage and divorce (Suryakusuma, 1996).2 
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In addition to the role of the state, gender norms are also defined by custom and ethnicity based 
legal systems (also called ‘adat’ law) which govern a range of rights, obligations and expectations on 
issues such as marriage, inheritance and dispute resolution. These ‘adat’ laws continue to be very 
important and there is often a tension between these laws and the religious and state legal systems 
(Buttenheim & Nobles, 2009). State ideology and ‘adat’ law together set a context within which 
most households function. While state ideology is less effective in defining gender roles in rural 
communities, there is still evidence of the erosion of women’s multiple roles, especially their roles as 
elders and ‘adat’ leaders (Suryakusuma, 1996). Households therefore are increasingly  a locus of the 
conflict between official ideologies of gender relations and the multiplicity of indigenous gender 
identities (Blackwood, 1995; Jones, 2002; Krier, 1995; Reenen, 2000; K. Sen, 1998). The extent of this 
conflict varies between rural and urban, elite and non-elite households with urban, elite households 
more affected by state ideology and rural, non-elite households affected by ‘adat’ law. This conflict 
is highlighted in the case of the Minangkabau, a matrilineal group within which women control 
economic production. Despite their role in managing rice fields and as farmers, the women describe 
themselves as housewives which Blackwood (1995) argues is not a sign of conformity. Instead, it is a 
redefinition of the notion of housewife to include productive activities whilst maintaining a façade of 
adherence to state ideology (Blackwood, 2007).  
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2. Literature Review 
Although autonomy and agency are frequently used interchangeably, there is considerable debate 
about both their meanings and their differences (Abrams, 1998; England, 1993; Kabeer, 1998; 
Rammohan & Johar, 2009). Overall, autonomy is typically focused on self-reliance and sufficiency 
(Friedman, 2000) while agency allows for cooperation as well as self-sufficiency. Our main focus is 
women’s ability to make strategic life choices which Kabeer (1999) argues is a characteristic of both 
autonomy and agency. We choose to focus on women’s agency in this paper because we see 
households as sites of interdependence, cooperation and conflict (A. Sen, 1989, 1990) within which 
both self-reliance and cooperation are important.  
Subjective well-being can be defined as “feeling good – enjoying life and wanting the feeling to be 
maintained” (Layard, 2006, p.12). While self-reported subjective well-being is generally seen as a 
good measure since people can consistently evaluate their own well-being (Frey & Stutzer, 2002), it 
can be unreliable in circumstances  where agency is missing (A. Sen, 2001). As Sen notes “a purely 
subjective form of utility [can be] moulded by social conditioning and a resigned acceptance of 
misfortune” (A. Sen, 1990, p.133) so that people report being happy even in quite extreme 
conditions of poverty or lack of agency. Sen proposes the idea of positional objectivity – which 
requires a person to move beyond the narrow perspective granted to them by their position within 
their society – as a means of understanding such inequality (A. Sen, 2009). This would enable a 
person to question accepted norms and practices within society. In this context, Sen argues in favour 
of objective measures of welfare and against an evaluation of welfare based only on an individual’s 
subjective assessments (Peter, 2003; A. Sen, 1990). While we agree that such adaptation to adverse 
circumstances makes subjective well-being problematic, we would argue that a lack of happiness in 
such circumstances is equally problematic. While policy makers and society at large clearly need to 
engage with the lack of agency, from the individual woman’s perspective, the lack of subjective well-
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being is an important problem.  Therefore, for an individual, both objective and subjective 
evaluations matter as they reflect a holistic continuum from resources to the capability to use these 
resources and then onto well-being (Della Giusta, Jewell, & Kambhampati, 2011). Our research here 
focuses on one element of this continuum – subjective well-being. This focus is not an endorsement 
for a subjective approach in preference of an objective one – both are needed for a balanced 
appraisal of a person’s life.  
Research shows gender differences in both self-reported well-being as well as the factors that 
influence well-being. Much of the existing literature on subjective well-being is focused on personal 
characteristics, microeconomic and macroeconomic factors (such as income, hours worked, inflation 
and unemployment) and social relationships (Argyle, 2003; Clark, Knabe, & Ratzel, 2010; Diener, Ng, 
Harter, & Arora, 2010; Diener & Suh, 2000; Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008; Easterlin, 2001; Frey & 
Stutzer, 2002; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 2003; Kenny & Kenny, 2006; Layard, 2006; Stutzer & 
Frey, 2010; Tella, MacCulloch, & Oswald, 2003). Studies in Western market economies find that 
while hours of paid employment increase both men’s and women’s subjective well-being (Della 
Giusta et al., 2011), employment is more central to men’s rather than women’s well-being (Argyle, 
2003), as is job satisfaction (Della Giusta et al., 2011). There is little overall difference in the impact 
of being married on men’s and women’s subjective well-being but a bad marriage has a greater 
negative impact on women than on men (Myers, 2003) while caring for dependents negatively 
affects women’s but not men’s subjective well-being (Della Giusta et al., 2011).  
Thapan (2003), in a study of subjective well-being in India found that education, number and sex of 
children, social relationships, deprivation and social norms for women are all significant 
determinants in India. Others, studying various developing countries, have found that well-being is 
associated with income (Argyle, 2003), relative standing (Bookwalter & Dalenberg, 2010), income 
inequality (Jiang, Lu, & Sato, 2012), rural-urban migration (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010), caste 
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(Fontaine & Yamada, 2014), political liberalisation (Richter, 2009) and urban vs. rural settings 
(Easterlin, Angelescu, & Zweig, 2011).  
Using almost the same household decisions as we use here, albeit from a different wave of the IFLS, 
Rammohan and Johar (2009) studied the determinants of married women’s autonomy. In contrast 
to our research, they used women’s household decision-making as the dependent variable, sorting 
women into three groups by type of autonomy. Similarly, household decision-making was also the 
dependent variable in research on the determinants of women’s autonomy using the Ethiopian 
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) which studied decision-making control over own health, daily 
household needs, large purchases for the household and visiting friends and family (Mabsout & van 
Staveren, 2009). Garikipati (2008), in a study using women’s say in household decision-making as an 
empowerment indicator, awarded points for women’s contribution both to making and initiating 
different types of decisions such as children’s education, crop, stock or land decisions, major 
financial decisions and sale negotiations. 
Research in psychology provides support for the linking of agency (control) with subjective well-
being. A perceived lack of agency has been shown to negatively impact a person’s self-esteem as 
well as their ability to perform a task and may even prevent a person from making an attempt (Fast, 
Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009; Grob, 2000; Skinner, 1995). Some studies also suggest a 
link between gender inequality and lower well-being for women, attributable to women’s relative 
powerlessness compared to men (Cassidy & Davies, 2003; Rosenfield, 1989). While men and women 
experience similar levels of mental health problems, the types of problems differ by gender with 
women being more likely to suffer from internalizing disorders and greater feelings of hopelessness 
and helplessness than men (Rosenfield, 1999; Rosenfield & Mouzon, 2013). However, agency can act 
as a moderating factor because of the perceived control it conveys as seen in a study of depression 
and exposure to stress among disadvantaged women (Grote, Bledsoe, Larkin, Lemay, & Brown, 
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2007). In the next section, we will describe the data and methodology that we will use in our analysis 
of women’s agency and well-being in Indonesia. 
3. Data and Methodology  
As mentioned earlier, we analyse our research question using data from Indonesia.  
Data  
The IFLS is a continuing longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey with the next wave planned 
for 2014-2015. The households which were included in the IFLS at inception in 1993 were 
representative of 83% of the Indonesian population and drawn from 13 of the 26 provinces, both 
rural and urban. Each wave was administered  to the original households from 1993 and to split-offs 
from those households, achieving a high re-contact rate of 90.6% for target households (Strauss, 
Witoelar, Sikoki, & Wattie, 2009). The IFLS provides data on a broad range of topics including both 
economic and non-economic well-being indicators like consumption, income, assets and  household 
decision-making (Frankenberg et al., 1995), making it a suitable choice for our research. There are 
four waves of the IFLS, starting in 1993 and ending in 2007. In this paper, we use the most recent 
wave of the IFLS (2007) as this was the only year in which the subjective well-being question was 
asked. In this wave, 13,535 households and 44,103 individuals were interviewed from both rural and 
urban enumeration areas. Interviews were conducted with several people within the household, not 
just the household head.3 For the decision-making module, both the household head and his or her 
spouse were interviewed (Strauss et al., 2009). We use data from both husbands and wives in our 
estimations which include rural and urban households.4  
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Measuring subjective well-being 
Our dependent variable is subjective well-being which was collected in IFLS4 from the question in 
Book 3A: 
“Taken all things together how would you say things are these days – would you say you 
were very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”  
Answers in the IFLS4 are ascribed to a four-step Likert scale coded so that one represents ‘very 
unhappy’ and four represents ‘very happy’. The relationship between agency and subjective well-
being is analysed using an ordered probit model which is commonly used for this type of analysis. 
This model was chosen as the data on subjective well-being takes the form of a four-step ordinal 
scale variable with a clear natural ordering.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Approximately 85% of both men and women reported that they were fairly happy. The mean 
subjective well-being score was 2.96 (std. dev. 0.3977) for men and 2.98 (std. dev. 0.3956) for 
women. 
We estimate the following model separately for men and women in our sample5  
 swbi = β1x1i + β2x2i + β3x3i + β4x4i + β5x5i + µi        
Where:  
swbi denotes the subjective well-being for an individual, (i=1, 2, ..... N); x1 denotes the vector of 
respondent’s demographic characteristics (age, religion, ethnicity, education); x2 denotes the vector 
of financial resources (income, use of loans, asset ownership); x3 denotes the vector of social capital 
proxies (cooperation, security); x4 denotes the vector of agency proxies; x5 denotes the vector of 
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spousal, household and community characteristics6 (spouses’ well-being, size of household, 
household’s use of electricity, community access to healthcare and electricity); and µi denotes the 
error term. The model allows us to control for a range of factors influencing well-being and therefore 
estimate specifically the impact of agency (x4) on well-being.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Based on the general model above, we estimate four models in this paper, each of which includes a 
different set of agency proxies. Model 1 is a reduced form model which includes indirect proxies (like 
relative age and relative education of the spouses) for agency. These are the measures which have 
been most commonly used within the literature and therefore Model 1 allows us to link into the 
existing literature. Model 2 uses direct proxies for agency in the form of household decision-making 
variables. In Models 3 and 4, we allow for the possibility that the error terms for husbands and wives 
are correlated by estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUREG) models. Although this 
required us to constrain the sample to only those households where data was available for both 
spouses (leaving us with a sample 7,759 individuals), it allows us to include spouse well-being into 
the respondent’s well-being model (Model 3). In Model 4, we create a single measure of decision-
making by linearly combining all the different spheres of household decision-making. 
As we are primarily interested in the relationship between agency and subjective well-being, we will 
concentrate on these variables in the rest of this paper. The descriptive statistics for all the variables 
are provided in Tables 2 and 3.  
Measuring Agency 
Until very recently, agency was typically modelled as intra-household inequalities in age, income or 
education (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Felkey, 2013; Kritz & Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1999; Mabsout & 
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van Staveren, 2009; Quisumbing, 2003). More recently, the collection of data on decision-making 
within households (as done both by the DHS and the IFLS) has facilitated the use of  direct measures 
of agency (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Felkey, 2013; Garikipati, 2008; Jejeebhoy, 2002; Mabsout & 
van Staveren, 2009; Quisumbing, 2003; Rammohan & Johar, 2009). This measures the influence and 
authority wielded by each spouse as revealed in the decisions they make (Anderson & Eswaran, 
2009). In the following sub-sections, we discuss all the agency variables included in our models.  
 (Insert Table 4 here) 
Relative income 
Relative income between spouses has often been used as a proxy for women’s agency (Felkey, 2013; 
Kambhampati, 2009). It is seen to be a variable that reflects the extent of bargaining power each 
spouse would wield within the household, given their contribution to the household’s economic 
resources. As a measure of agency or even bargaining power, it faces two main problems. Firstly, it is 
only an indirect proxy for women’s agency and secondly, it is likely to be endogenous to previous 
household decisions. This variable is also unable to capture the intricacies of households as sites of 
competing interests, cooperation, conflict and differing areas of authority. In addition, it cannot 
capture how slow moving social norms can offset and limit the agency that women gain from income 
(Mabsout & van Staveren, 2009). In this paper, we include it as a variable in our preliminary 
estimates to allow comparison across studies.  
Relative income is formulated as the ratio of either wives’ income to joint spousal income (for 
women) or husbands’ income to joint spousal income (for men). Men contributed 62% of joint 
spousal income in our sample.  
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Relative education 
Unlike relative income, relative education is likely to be exogenous, having been undertaken prior to 
marriage in most cases. Relative education between spouses has often been used as a proxy for 
women’s agency (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Mabsout & van Staveren, 2009; Quisumbing, 2003) 
because educated women are likely to be more knowledgeable about their outside options, more 
articulate and therefore more persuasive in the context of intra-household bargaining. Women’s 
education should also enable access to employment opportunities, increase women’s awareness of 
their options, increase human capital and give women the confidence to use their agency. In this 
paper, relative education is a dummy variable which is equal to one where wives’ education level is 
greater than their husbands’ (for women) and vice versa (for men). We use the highest level of 
schooling completed by both spouses. Table 4 indicates that 22% of men had more education than 
their spouses compared to 12% of women. In the vast majority of cases, therefore, both spouses 
have equal levels of education. This is confirmed by figures for primary schooling in Indonesia of 93% 
for boys and 98% for girls (Statistics Indonesia & Macro International, 2008).7  
Relative age 
Relative age is formulated as the ratio of wives’ age to husbands’ age for women and vice versa for 
men (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Kritz & Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1999; Mabsout & van Staveren, 
2009). It is expected that if women are much younger than their husbands they will have less 
autonomy and independence, making relative age a good proxy for capturing women’s agency.  
There is a small gap between average relative age of husbands and wives in our sample although this 
average is higher when men are older than their spouses (1.14 compared to 0.89).  
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Household decision-making variables – a more direct measure of agency 
As seen in the literature review, a number of studies (Garikipati, 2008; Mabsout & van Staveren, 
2009; Rammohan & Johar, 2009) model agency as decision-making. Our measure of agency is in the 
spirit of these studies, concentrating on decision making in six domains – child-related decisions, 
large household expenditures, small household expenditure, cash and gift-giving, savings and leisure. 
In each of these domains (except leisure), decisions can be made by the respondent only, the 
respondent’s spouse only, jointly by the respondent and spouse or by others. Decisions relating to 
leisure are made only by the respondent. Our single measure of decision-making calculates the 
proportion of decisions across all domains that are made each by the respondent alone, by his or her 
spouse, by the respondent and spouse jointly or by others. Details of the construction of our 
decision-making variables are in the Appendix. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
Table 5 above provides summary statistics for our decision making variables. For men and women, 
we see that in all five domains where joint decision-making is possible, the decisions are 
predominantly made jointly except for small household expenditures where a majority of the 
decisions are made by women. For women, joint decision-making dominates decisions made by all 
other agents in all five domains. Not all types of decisions made within a household are of equal 
importance (Kabeer, 1999) so the separation into these decision groups captures different types and 
levels of agency. As such, we consider each of these domains more carefully in what follows. 
The financial decisions 
Decisions relating to small household expenditure, savings, large household expenditure and gift 
giving are all financial decisions. Table 5 indicates that the vast majority (approximately 80%) of both 
large household expenditure decisions and gift giving decisions are made jointly by the spouses. 
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While savings decisions are also made jointly, this is a much lower proportion of decisions at 
approximately 33%. Finally, we see that the vast majority (approximately 64%) of small expenditure 
decisions are made by the woman alone.  
While small household expenditure decisions, by definition, involve smaller amounts of money they 
are fungible and therefore give women flexibility which might help increase their subjective well-
being. In our sample, women typically make these decisions on their own with over 80% of men 
taking no part in these types of decisions. 
In Indonesia, participation in community or village ceremonies is the norm, often requiring reciprocal 
gift giving. Similarly, transfers of money within the extended family to those in need are a common 
occurrence (Park, 2003). We expect control over cash and gift-giving decisions to increase subjective 
well-being as it facilitates social relationships and also brings the expectation of future reciprocity.  
These financial decision-making variables can be used to test whether a woman’s control over 
resources within the household increases her subjective well-being. Control over these resources 
increases women’s capability set and, therefore, their ability to cope with their life conditions –
regardless of whether women choose to use this agency.  
Decisions relating to children 
A major sphere of decision-making amongst married couples relates to children. This might include 
economic choices (how much to spend on their food, education, health etc.) as well as non-
economic choices (which school to send them to, the level of freedom they enjoy and so forth). The 
ability to make decisions in this sphere reflects a level of agency for women, which could help 
increase their well-being.  
Table 5 indicates that despite state attempts to delineate children and the home as the woman’s 
domain through the Marriage Law, 70% of child-related decisions are jointly made. It also indicates 
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that 14% of child-related decisions are made by wives (for men) but only 3% are made by husbands 
(for women). Exercising agency in relation to child-related decisions should increase women’s 
subjective well-being. Even though these decisions capture women’s agency constrained by their 
domestic roles, there are benefits to women’s subjective well-being from ‘doing gender’ (Bittman et 
al., 2003; Greenstein, 1995, 2000; Gupta, 2006; Ono & Raymo, 2006; Tichenor, 1999). Also, children 
in Indonesia typically support their parents in old-age. Women are less likely to be employed in 
pensionable, formal sector jobs and have less access to financial resources than men (Koning et al., 
2000; Philip Kreager & Schroder-Butterfill, 2009; Schroder-Butterfill & Kreager, 2007), so control over 
this decision-type could function as a form of future social security.  
Other decisions – own leisure time 
The ability to control one’s own time use is likely to positively impact subjective well-being especially 
when it enables individuals to make decisions about their leisure time. Such control may enable 
women to regulate the extent to which they are affected by a double or triple shift (Moser, 1989). 
Control over leisure time encompasses considerations such as time spent with family which should 
also positively affect subjective well-being. 43% of men and 33% of women make decisions regarding 
their use of their leisure time.  
Issues arising 
Before we move on to our results in the next section, it is worth considering methodological issues 
that arise in estimations of this kind. The most important of these is the issue of endogeneity which 
affects most analyses of well-being and might arise either from reverse causality or from variables 
omitted from our analysis. If a variable that influences subjective well-being (like personality) is not 
included in the model, then it affects the error term and because its effect persists over time, it could 
bias our estimates. As previously noted, ours is a cross-section dataset as only the IFLS4 included the 
subjective well-being question. Fixed effects methods could not be used, leaving time dependence in 
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income or subjective well-being unaddressed. Our results are therefore probably better viewed as 
correlations between subjective well-being and specific proxies for women’s agency. In addition, 
there is also the possibility in estimations of this kind that employment, income, marital status and 
other variables may not really be exogenous, being dependent on people’s sense of satisfaction to 
begin with (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004). To correct for potential endogeneity arising from the 
inclusion of income, we use a lagged income variable (i.e. income not from the time of the interview 
but from the preceding year) as an instrument for current income in our model. To the extent that 
there is path-dependence in income earned lagging in this way mitigates, but does not completely 
remove, endogeneity. Finally, since the IFLS data on household decision-making8 was only collected 
from married couples, we do not include marital status in our model. Our estimates may, therefore, 
also be affected by sample selection that is inherent in the dataset and any study of intra-household 
bargaining.  
4. Estimation results 
Table 6 presents our estimation results. As already discussed above, we estimate four versions of our 
model. The first includes spousal inequality proxies for age, income and education (Model 1), while 
the second includes direct decision making variables. Models 3 and 4 are estimated on a dataset 
limited to matched couples into which spousal well-being could be included. They are estimated 
using SUREG methodology. Model 4 has a single, scalar measure of decision-making for the 
proportion of all the household decisions made by the respondent, his/ her spouse, jointly or by 
others. Table 6 presents the results only for our direct and indirect measures of agency. The controls 
included in the models are household income, asset ownership, borrowing, age, education levels, 
social capital, household size, access to healthcare and electricity, ethnicity and religion. The results 
of these controls are not presented in the tables to keep them manageable. In the rest of this 
section, we will concentrate on the decisions which have a significant relationship with subjective 
well-being, focusing on decisions made by the respondent, his or her spouse and joint decisions. We 
18 
will not discuss decisions made by third parties9 as these are a very small proportion of decision-
makers. In each case, the base category is decisions made by the individual himself or herself so all 
coefficients are interpreted using this base. 
Our results show a relationship between agency and a person’s subjective well-being. In addition, 
this relationship differs for men and women. We find that the relationship between agency and 
subjective well-being can be either positive or negative, depending on the domain over which 
agency is exercised.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The indirect proxies for agency 
Table 6 (Model 1) indicates that relative income is not significantly related to well-being for either 
men or women. We can speculate that relative income might be a less effective measure of agency in 
Indonesia because most Indonesian women are either economically active (Elmhirst, 2000) or 
manage household finances (Brenner, 1995). Relative age, on the other hand, is positive and 
significant for women. This indicates that women’s well-being is higher when they are closer in age 
to their husband. Finally, we find in Model 1 that relative education has a significant, negative effect 
on the well-being of men leading us to conclude that men in Indonesia are happier when their wives 
are as educated as they are. This might relate to a man’s prestige being associated with his wife’s 
level of education. Alternatively, it might result from the failure to match themselves to wives with 
similar education being seen as poor performance in the marriage market.10 However, it might also 
relate to the fact that educated women are better able to contribute to household decisions (for 
instance with regard to finances or children) which takes the pressure off men and leads to them 
feeling happier.  
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The direct measures of agency 
In the following discussion, we consider the results separately for men and women. 
Men 
Looking at the estimation results for Model 4 first (Column 7 of Table 6), we see a significant and 
positive relationship between men’s subjective well-being and not having sole responsibility for 
household decision-making. Thus, men are happiest when decisions are made jointly rather than by 
themselves alone (the base category). They are happier (though less than in the case of joint 
decision-making) when their spouses or others make these decisions. These results seem to indicate 
that, for the vast majority of household decisions, men prefer to share or hand over responsibility. 
What is not clear, however, is whether this differs across the various domains of decision making. 
Turning to Model 2, we see that different types of decisions affect men’s subjective well-being in 
different ways (Column 3 of Table 6). Men’s subjective well-being is lower when the proportion of 
child-related decisions made by their spouses’ increases as compared to a situation where they make 
these decisions themselves. This is a surprising result in light of the fact that children typically fall 
primarily within women’s domain in the household (Folbre, 1994a, 1994b) and the state in Indonesia 
declares it as such. Another sphere of decision-making that men would prefer to control is cash and 
gift-giving: their well-being is significantly lower when their spouses control this aspect of household 
behaviour. Looking at marginal effects11 at the mean (Table 8), men are 2.7% more likely to be in the 
‘unhappy’ category when their wives make cash-giving decisions. This includes both the giving of 
monies to one’s own parents or other family members, one’s in-laws and gift-giving for parties and 
weddings. For many ethnic groups in Indonesia, elderly family members receive support from both 
sons and daughters. But, sons typically provide monetary support while daughters provide personal 
care (Philip Kreager & Schroder-Butterfill, 2009; P. Kreager & Schröder-Butterfill, 2005; Schroder-
Butterfill & Kreager, 2007), which might explain the relationship between having control over this 
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variable and well-being for men. It is also a very visible form of agency and so there might be status 
associated with it. 
On the other hand, men’s well-being is positively associated with their spouses making a higher 
proportion of savings decisions. Looking at marginal effects (compared to the mean) in Table 8, men 
are 2.6% more likely to fall into the ‘very happy’ category if their wives make all savings decision and 
2.8% more likely to fall in that category when decisions are made jointly. Finally, men’s subjective 
well-being is significantly greater when they control use of their leisure time. Despite the reduced 
sample size and the inclusion of spousal well-being in Model 3, the savings and own leisure 
coefficients remain significant. 
Overall, therefore, in Indonesia we can conclude that men’s subjective well-being is higher when 
they are not solely responsible for financial decisions (except gift giving). It is also higher when they 
can keep control of child-related decisions, use of their leisure time and gift giving. These results 
imply that cooperation can be beneficial to men’s subjective well-being, but not in every situation.  
Women 
Our results for women’s well-being, on the other hand, indicate that the proportion of all household 
decisions made by her spouse is not significantly associated with a woman’s well-being (Column 8, 
Table 6). Model 2 indicates that women’s well-being is not related to the proportion of child-related, 
large and small household expenditure decisions made by her spouse. While the result with respect 
to child-related decisions is surprising, it might indicate that this is a sphere within which women are 
sufficiently confident such that they do not feel threatened when their spouses make more of these 
decisions. On the other hand, it might indicate that women’s well-being is enhanced by cooperation 
within their relationship. However, women’s subjective well-being (like their spouses’) is better if 
they can make decisions about gifts jointly, perhaps for similar reasons to those discussed above. 
Looking at marginal effects at the mean, they are 2.8% more likely to be in the ‘very happy’ category 
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when these decisions are made jointly. Indonesian women, in particular elite Javanese women, are 
often responsible for managing the social and community relationships on behalf of their families 
(Weix, 2000) and are heavily dependent on informal and formal networks (Wolf, 2000). In this 
context, having some control over cash and gift-giving is likely to be important to maintaining these 
networks which, in turn, is crucial for the individual’s well-being. Similar to the results for men, the 
larger the proportion of savings-related decisions made by their spouses, the higher is women’s well-
being (Column 4, Table 6). Compared to the mean, women are 6.4% more likely to fall into the ‘very 
happy’ category when their husbands make all savings decisions and 1.7% more likely to be in this 
category when decisions are made jointly (Table 8). Thus, women’s subjective well-being increases 
when savings decisions are not entirely their own responsibility but are made jointly or wholly by her 
spouse.  
The burden of responsibility 
Our results lead us to conclude that women (and men) in Indonesia are happier when most decisions 
are jointly made rather than when they are made solely by them. This could arise from the fact that 
agency comes with a burden of responsibility. Our results suggest that, for men at least, having less 
responsibility or sharing it with their wives is associated with higher subjective well-being. However, 
not all forms of responsibility are equally burdensome. Some financial decisions, like savings, have a 
long term impact on a household’s living standards, carry more responsibility, result in greater blame 
in the event of a bad decision and are often a major source of contention (Vogler, Lyonette, & 
Wiggins, 2008). Our estimation results show that not being wholly responsible for savings decisions 
is related to greater subjective well-being for both men and women in Indonesia.  
For women, this ‘burden of responsibility’ effect appears to affect both cash giving and savings 
decisions. Collaborative approaches or even relinquishing control are more beneficial to women’s 
subjective well-being than more individualistic approaches. This suggests that attempts to improve 
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women’s agency by increasing their control over finances might not necessarily improve their 
subjective well-being. It is too simplistic to assume that all factors which improve a woman’s outside 
options in the context of marital breakdown will automatically increase their subjective well-being – 
instead a more nuanced approach is needed. Social norms typically restrict key decision-making 
areas to men’s control as heads of households (Kabeer, 1999) while research in both Indonesia and 
the Philippines shows both men and women verbalizing the gender stereotype that men lack the 
self-control to manage the household finances (Ashraf, 2009; Brenner, 1995). This suggests that 
having sole control over household finances requires women to balance controlling their husbands’ 
behaviour (to avoid depleting household resources) with conforming to social norms. Arguably, 
avoiding having to control their husband’s behaviour might be why joint decision-making has a 
positive impact on women’s but not men’s subjective well-being as it alleviates some of this conflict 
for women.  
5. Discussion  
Our results are surprising and seem to indicate two things. Firstly, Indonesia is different from other 
countries where female agency studies have been conducted in that there is significant equality to 
start with as indicated by our summary statistics. This might be why men and women prefer to 
collaborate on most household decisions. This is also seen from our results for relative education, 
which indicated that men preferred wives who had education levels similar to their own. Secondly, 
while decision-making might reflect increased agency this need not increase well-being. With 
increased agency comes increased responsibility which might well increase burdens, as we saw 
above. 
There is significant evidence that agency is an important aspect of well-being, interpreted broadly. 
Sen’s capability framework would argue that agency is essential in providing individuals with choices 
which increases the capability set (A. Sen, 1985a; A. Sen, 1993). The Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDGs), as well as the post-2015 development agenda, are predicated on the notion that greater 
agency for women is better than less as it is likely to help both development and family welfare. Our 
results, however, seem to indicate that increased agency is not necessarily related to increased 
subjective well-being. It seems necessary and important to understand this result.  
In this context, it is worth noting that the IFLS specifically asked about happiness rather than a more 
evaluative measure of well-being such as life satisfaction. While individuals may not be ‘happy’ with 
increased responsibility, the ability to make decisions and be independent is likely to increase their 
satisfaction with their life and therefore their longer term well-being. Thus, to the extent that well-
being has both subjective and objective facets (including welfare, contentment and dignity (Kenny & 
Kenny, 2006)), we might expect agency to have a positive impact on well-being broadly though the 
impact on short-term happiness might not be straightforward.  
In addition, it is possible (and likely) that the case of Indonesia is different to that of most developing 
countries in terms of the roles of men and women. The adherence to socially prescribed roles for 
women does not seem to increase women’s subjective well-being – perhaps because these gendered 
roles have become naturalized and are not open to negotiation (Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1999). It is 
also possible to speculate that this might be due to women’s duties as wives and mothers being 
enshrined in law in Indonesia such that the domestic domain forms the main locus of women’s 
identity. The Marriage Law No. 1/1974 turns into an obligation what might otherwise be a choice and 
details women’s five ‘key duties’ which include a responsibility to procreate and care for children 
(Yulindrasari & McGregor, 2011). This process results in women being trapped in their ‘natural’ roles 
without being able to question if this is what they really want or make a choice as to their behaviour. 
It is interesting to speculate what the impact might be if this ‘naturalized’ role were to be taken away 
from women – would it increase or decrease their subjective well-being? If the gender socialization 
of women is strong enough and widely enough held, losing this role might decrease their subjective 
well-being.    
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6. Conclusion 
This paper began with an acceptance that agency is ‘good’ for both men and women. It is what 
defines the freedom of the individual. We also know that women’s agency has been identified as 
being beneficial for household welfare in a range of studies across many countries. Our research 
does not discount the importance and relevance of agency’s instrumental value. Instead, our 
objective in this paper was to consider if such agency is also linked with an increase or a decrease in 
subjective well-being. In other words, does agency have intrinsic value? Our results show that agency 
is intrinsically valuable as seen in its strong relationship to subjective well-being. But, this 
relationship is not always straightforward. 
We have analysed this relationship using decision-making variables, which are direct measures of 
agency. Household decision-making is essentially about control of different aspects of life within the 
family which makes these proxies a good tool for capturing the relationship between agency and 
subjective well-being. We find that, of all the types of decisions in the IFLS4 dataset, the decisions 
which affect subjective well-being are financial decisions, child-related decisions and decisions over 
one’s own leisure time.  
The interplay of agency and the ‘burden of responsibility’ on subjective well-being might be a 
possible explanation for the sometimes unforeseen outcomes that result from development or 
empowerment initiatives. Women might hesitate to use or participate in initiatives which increase 
this ‘burden of responsibility’ as their subjective well-being suffers. We are not advocating ignoring 
agency in favour of a complete focus on subjective well-being. Instead, our research posits that 
agency and subjective well-being need to be considered together as both are necessary to one’s 
holistic physical and psychic well-being.  
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Appendix 1: Summary statistics and additional estimation results 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics and construction of the decision-making variables  
Variable How the variable was created Cronbach’s alpha 
score* 
Proportion of child-
related decisions made 
by spouse 
One dummy variable was created for each child 
related decision (children’s health, children’s 
education and children’s clothes) made solely by 
spouses.  
These three child-related decisions were added 
together and normalized to proportions of 1 to 
make a single child-related decision making variable 
to show the proportion of decisions made by 
spouses.   
0.73 
Proportion of cash-
giving decisions made 
by spouse 
Method as above for giving money to the 
respondent’s family, giving money to spouse’s family 
and gifts for parties/weddings.  
0.72 
Proportion of savings 
decisions made by 
spouse 
Method as above for monthly ROSCA and monthly 
savings.   
0.51 
Proportion of small 
household expenditure 
decisions made by 
spouse 
Method as above for expenditure on food eaten at 
home and routine household purchases. 
0.86 
Proportion of large One dummy variable was created for the decision  
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Variable How the variable was created Cronbach’s alpha 
score* 
household expenditure 
decisions made by 
spouse 
on large household expenditure made solely by 
spouses. There was only one decision of this type. 
Proportion of child-
related decisions made 
jointly  
Method as above for children’s health, children’s 
education and children’s clothes. 
0.83 
Proportion of cash-
giving decisions made 
jointly 
Method as above for giving money to the 
respondent’s family, giving money to spouse’s family 
and gifts for parties/weddings.   
0.80 
Proportion of savings 
decisions made jointly 
Method as above for monthly ROSCA and monthly 
savings. 
0.61 
Proportion of small 
household expenditure 
decisions made jointly 
Method as above for expenditure on food eaten at 
home and routine household purchases. 
0.76 
Proportion of large 
household expenditure 
decisions made jointly 
One dummy variable was created for the decision 
on large household expenditure made by 
respondents and spouses. There was only one 
decision of this type. 
 
 
*Used to check the suitability of these groupings 
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Table 8 Extract of significant marginal effects from subjective well-being Model 2     
VARIABLES 
  
Model 2 - men Model 2 - women 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Proportion of child related decisions made 
by spouse 0.0011** 0.0239** -0.0038** -0.0211** -0.0002 -0.005 -0.0006 0.0058 
 [0.000] [0.010] [0.002] [0.008] [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.014] 
Proportion of child related decisions made 
jointly 0.0007** 0.0169** -0.0027** -0.0150** 0.0002 0.0051 0.0006 -0.0059 
 [0.000] [0.007] [0.001] [0.006] [0.000] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006] 
Proportion of large household expenditure 
decisions made by spouse (d) -0.0002 -0.0049 0.0005 0.0045 0.0002 0.0036 0.0002 -0.004 
 [0.000] [0.010] [0.001] [0.010] [0.000] [0.010] [0.000] [0.010] 
Proportion of large household expenditure 
decisions made jointly (d) -0.0003 -0.0073 0.0015 0.0062 -0.0004 -0.0086 -0.0003 0.0093 
 [0.000] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.000] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] 
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VARIABLES 
  
Model 2 - men Model 2 - women 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Proportion of cash giving and gift decisions 
made by spouse 0.0012* 0.0269** -0.0043* -0.0238** -0.0008 -0.0172 -0.002 0.02 
 [0.001] [0.013] [0.002] [0.012] [0.001] [0.014] [0.002] [0.016] 
Proportion of cash giving and gift decisions 
made jointly -0.0004 -0.0101 0.0016 0.0089 -0.0012** -0.0243*** -0.0028* 0.0283*** 
 [0.000] [0.009] [0.001] [0.008] [0.000] [0.007] [0.001] [0.008] 
Proportion of savings decisions made by 
spouse -0.0013** -0.0299*** 0.0048** 0.0265*** -0.0026** -0.0553*** -0.0064** 0.0643*** 
 [0.000] [0.008] [0.002] [0.007] [0.001] [0.014] [0.003] [0.016] 
Proportion of savings decisions made jointly -0.0014*** -0.0311*** 0.0050** 0.0275*** -0.0007** -0.0142*** -0.0016* 0.0165*** 
 [0.000] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
Proportion of household expenses decisions 
made by spouse -0.0009** -0.0198** 0.0032* 0.0175** 0.0001 0.0021 0.0002 -0.0024 
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VARIABLES 
  
Model 2 - men Model 2 - women 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
 [0.000] [0.009] [0.002] [0.008] [0.000] [0.007] [0.001] [0.008] 
Proportion of household expenses decisions 
made by spouse -0.0003 -0.0068 0.0011 0.006 0.0002 0.0045 0.0005 -0.0052 
 [0.000] [0.010] [0.002] [0.009] [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
Respondent only decision: use of own 
leisure time (d) -0.0005** -0.0112** 0.0016** 0.0101** 0.0001 0.0028 0.0003 -0.0032 
  [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.004] 
No of obs 8,983 8,983 8,983 8,983 9,441 9,441 9,441 9,441 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0577 0.0577 0.0577 0.0577 0.0531 0.0531 0.0531 0.0531 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
Standard errors in brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
Dependent variable is subjective well-being where 1=very unhappy; 2=unhappy; 3=happy; and 4=very happy 
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VARIABLES 
  
Model 2 - men Model 2 - women 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Very 
unhappy Unhappy Happy Very happy 
Marginal effects at the means 
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Appendix 2: Household decision-making in the IFLS4 
As noted previously, the IFLS4 contained 18 types of decisions. There were: 
 Expenditure on food eaten at home;  
 Choice of food eaten at home;  
 Routine household purchases;  
 The respondent’s clothes;  
 The respondent’s spouse’s clothes;  
 The respondent’s children’s clothes;  
 The respondent’s children’s education;  
 The respondent’s children’s health;  
 Large expensive household purchases;  
 Giving money to the respondent’s parents or family;  
 Giving money to the respondent’s spouse’s parents or family;  
 Giving gifts for parties or weddings;  
 Using money for monthly ROSCA (Arisan);  
 Using money for monthly savings;  
 Husband’s time spent socializing;  
 Wife’s time spent socializing;  
 Whether the respondent or the respondent’s spouse works;  
 Whether the respondent and spouse use contraception. 
 
In addition to the large number of decisions, there were also 16 different choices of decision-
makers: 
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 Respondent; 
 Spouse; 
 Son; 
 Daughter; 
 Mother; 
 Father; 
 Mother-in-law; 
 Father-in-law; 
 Brother; 
 Sister; 
 Brother-in-law; 
 Sister-in-law; 
 Grandparent; 
 Son/daughter-in-law; 
 Grandchild; and  
 Other. 
Creating the decision-making variables 
We started by creating a dummy variable for each decision and decision-maker in the groups in 
Table 5. To illustrate, let us consider decisions relating to children. Three dummy variables were 
created for each child related decision (children’s health, children’s education and children’s clothes) 
for each of the four decision-makers (respondent, spouse, joint or other). In other words, 12 dummy 
variables were created. Then, the three child-related decisions were added together and normalized 
to proportions of one for each decision-maker. Thus, the respondent might make only one child-
related decision alone in which case this variable would be one-third for them or they might make all 
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three decisions alone (in which case the variable would be one). To create our overall measure of 
direct agency, we use simple aggregation of all the different decision-making spheres for each 
decision-maker.   
34 
 
Tables to be inserted into main text 
Table 1 Subjective well-being by gender 
Subjective well-being score Gender 
Total 
Men Women 
Very unhappy 41 46 87 
Unhappy 1,229 1,185 2,414 
Happy 11,754 12,970 24,724 
Very happy 813 1,017 1,830 
Total 13,837 15,218 29,055 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for continuous control variables 
Variable Definition Men Women 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Age 
Respondent's 
age at the 
time of IFLS4 30.7433 20.8596 31.6945 21.4489 
Log of household income1 
Log of 
household 
income in 
the last year 16.1973 1.1530 16.1693 1.1985 
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Household size  
Number of 
household 
members 
excluding 
young, non-
school age 
children 6.6641 3.4625 6.6739 3.4904 
Young children (number) 
Number of 
young, non-
school age 
children in 
the 
household 0.1237 0.3741 0.1268 0.3780 
Social capital proxy: cooperation2 
Respondent's 
willingness 
to help 
people in 
his/her 
village 3.1747 0.4032 3.1285 0.3611 
Social capital proxy: security2 
Respondents' 
views on 
village safety 3.0798 0.3814 3.0615 0.3621 
Spouse's well-being 
Well-being of 
respondent's 
spouse 2.9978 0.3752 2.9709 0.3930 
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1 Note that these are small amounts of c. £500-£700. This is based on an exchange rate of Rupiah (Rp.) 18,928 
to £1 which was the spot rate as at 14 March 2014  
2 Note that this is a scale from 1 to 4 where 1=strongly disagree and 4=strongly agree  
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for dummy control variables 
Variables Definition Men Women 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Christianity1 
Christian=1, 
Else=0 0.0650 0.2466 0.0655 0.2474 
Other religion1 
Other 
religions=1, 
Christian or 
Muslim=0 0.0486 0.2150 0.0496 0.2172 
Ethnicity: Sundanese2 
Sundanese=1, 
Else=0 0.1229 0.3283 0.1222 0.3275 
Ethnicity: Batak2 Batak=1, Else=0 0.0463 0.2102 0.0468 0.2112 
Ethnicity: Minangkabau2 
Minangkabau=1, 
Else=0 0.0452 0.2077 0.0446 0.2065 
Ethnicity: Other ethnicities2 
Other 
ethnicities=1, 
Javanese, 
Sundanese, 
Batak or 
Minangkabau=0 0.3837 0.4863 0.3826 0.4860 
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Secondary education 
Up to secondary 
education=1, 
Else=0 0.4398 0.4964 0.3817 0.4858 
Higher education 
Up to higher 
education=1, 
Else=0 0.0884 0.2839 0.0780 0.2681 
Islamic education 
Islamic 
education=1, 
Else=0 0.0586 0.2349 0.0671 0.2502 
Ownership of own house 
Ownership of 
own house=1, 
Else=0 0.7642 0.4245 0.7770 0.4163 
Use of loans in the last 12 months 
Use of loans=1, 
Else=0 0.1883 0.3910 0.1835 0.3871 
Community facilities: electricity 
Community has 
electricity=1, 
Else=0 1.0064 0.1199 1.0064 0.1317 
Community facilities: health 
Community has 
midwife=1, 
Else=0 1.5101 0.8718 1.5157 0.8749 
Household has electricity 
Household has 
electricity=1, 
Else=0 1.0754 0.3873 1.0741 0.3861 
1 The majority of the population in Indonesia is Muslim which is the base category used here  
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2 Note that the largest ethnic group in Indonesia is the Javanese. They are used as the base category. In our 
paper we include the four largest ethnic groups which range from patriarchal and patrilineal (Batak) to bilateral 
(Javanese) to matrilineal (Minangkabau) 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for relative income, age and education 
VARIABLES Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std. dev. 
Relative income (men) 0.618 0.2148 
Relative income (women) 0.382 0.2148 
Relative education (men) 4,716 22.39 
Relative education (women) 2,660 11.96 
Relative age (men) 1.14 0.157 
Relative age (women) 0.89 0.113 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics for the decision-making variables 
Variable Men Women 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Proportion of child related decisions made by spouse 0.1395 0.2700 0.0337 0.1467 
Proportion of child related decisions made jointly 0.6947 0.3922 0.7075 0.3828 
Proportion of child related decisions made by others 0.0380 0.1565 0.0441 0.1588 
Proportion of large household expenditure  decisions made 
by spouse 0.0696 0.2545 0.0954 0.2938 
Proportion of large household expenditure  decisions made 0.7659 0.4234 0.7906 0.4069 
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jointly 
Proportion of large household expenditure  decisions made 
by others 0.0473 0.2123 0.0513 0.2206 
Proportion of cash giving and gift  decisions made by spouse 0.0730 0.2060 0.0452 0.1685 
Proportion of cash giving and gift  decisions made jointly 0.8070 0.3341 0.8194 0.3239 
Proportion of cash giving and gift  decisions made by others 0.0033 0.0431 0.0050 0.0504 
Proportion of savings  decisions made by spouse 0.1175 0.2643 0.0298 0.1339 
Proportion of savings  decisions made jointly 0.3254 0.3981 0.3258 0.3969 
Proportion of savings  decisions made by others 0.0077 0.0686 0.0103 0.0823 
Proportion of small household expenditure  decisions made 
by spouse 0.6360 0.4347 0.0670 0.2231 
Proportion of small household expenditure  decisions made 
jointly 0.2532 0.3885 0.2490 0.3888 
Proportion of small household expenditure  decisions made 
by others 0.0390 0.1806 0.0992 0.2824 
Proportion of all household decisions made by spouse 0.2012 0.1761 0.0476 0.1138 
Proportion of all household decisions made jointly 0.5849 0.2444 0.5934 0.2390 
Proportion of all household decisions made by others 0.0240 0.0746 0.0380 0.0915 
Respondent only decision: use of own leisure time 0.4349 0.4958 0.3359 0.4723 
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Table 6 Subjective well-being ordered probit models – agency proxy results  
 
Variables Whole sample Couples 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Relative income -0.7559 0.3228 
      
 
[0.582] [0.408] 
      Relative income
2
 0.6204 -0.0608 
      
 
[0.484] [0.485] 
      Relative age 0.2854 0.4326* 
      
 
[0.180] [0.249] 
      Relative education -0.1779** -0.0887 
      
 
[0.070] [0.077] 
      Proportion of child related decisions made by spouse 
  
-0.17496** 0.03880 -0.0297 0.0832 
  
 
  
[0.078] [0.121] [0.071] [0.105] 
  Proportion of child related decisions made jointly 
  
-0.11450** -0.04999 -0.0071 0.0008 
  
   
[0.055] [0.049] [0.054] [0.047] 
  Proportion of child related decisions made by others 
  
0.06023 0.11822 0.0725 0.1133 
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[0.116] [0.114] [0.106] [0.102] 
  Proportion of large household expenditure  decisions made by spouse 
  
0.04699 -0.05733 0.0279 -0.0408 
  
   
[0.082] [0.092] [0.067] [0.076] 
  Proportion of large household expenditure  decisions made jointly 
  
0.06104 0.06028 0.0382 0.0080 
  
   
[0.054] [0.076] [0.047] [0.064] 
  Proportion of large household expenditure  decisions made by others 
  
0.06189 0.00620 0.0822 -0.1699 
  
   
[0.096] [0.104] [0.092] [0.108] 
  Proportion of cash giving and gift  decisions made by spouse 
  
-0.21256** 0.16208 -0.1197 0.0431 
  
   
[0.105] [0.134] [0.088] [0.104] 
  Proportion of cash giving and gift  decisions made jointly 
  
0.07926 0.23980*** 0.0252 0.0797 
  
   
[0.069] [0.067] [0.058] [0.059] 
  Proportion of cash giving and gift  decisions made by others 
  
-0.03870 0.00667 0.0413 0.0522 
  
   
[0.288] [0.303] [0.534] [0.389] 
  Proportion of savings  decisions made by spouse 
  
0.22071*** 0.53339*** 0.1001* 0.2245** 
  
   
[0.062] [0.132] [0.056] [0.106] 
  Proportion of savings  decisions made jointly 
  
0.24057*** 0.12519*** 0.1312*** 0.0114 
  
   
[0.042] [0.041] [0.039] [0.038] 
  Proportion of savings  decisions made by others 
  
-0.04548 0.05968 -0.1113 0.0977 
  
   
[0.208] [0.177] [0.254] [0.202] 
  Proportion of small household expenditure  decisions made by spouse 
  
0.13945** 0.00745 0.0648 0.0225 
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[0.071] [0.070] [0.061] [0.063] 
  Proportion of small household expenditure  decisions made jointly 
  
0.03399 -0.03647 0.0026 -0.0163 
  
   
[0.078] [0.041] [0.067] [0.037] 
  Proportion of small household expenditure  decisions made by others 
  
0.16992 0.06466 0.1337 0.0149 
  
   
[0.113] [0.063] [0.172] [0.086] 
  Respondent only decision: use of own leisure time 
  
0.09245*** -0.03538 0.0551* -0.0206 0.0566** -0.0192 
   
[0.031] [0.032] [0.028] [0.030] [0.028] [0.030] 
Spouse's well-being 
    
1.8625*** 1.8567*** 1.8669*** 1.8594*** 
     
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] 
Proportion of all household decisions made by spouse 
      
0.1702* 0.2006 
       
[0.103] [0.129] 
Proportion of all household decisions made jointly 
      
0.2398*** 0.0857 
       
[0.081] [0.070] 
Proportion of all household decisions made by others 
      
0.4637* 0.0917 
       
[0.264] [0.209] 
cut1 
        Constant 
  
-0.45798 -0.81876** 3.6054*** 3.3144*** 3.6877*** 3.3271*** 
   
[0.336] [0.354] [0.430] [0.437] [0.424] [0.431] 
cut2 
        Constant 
  
0.97172*** 0.55106 5.1786*** 4.8728*** 5.2563*** 4.8761*** 
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[0.334] [0.354] [0.428] [0.433] [0.421] [0.426] 
cut3 
        Constant 
  
4.06657*** 3.71956*** 7.92786*** 7.66219*** 7.99542*** 7.65535*** 
   
[0.339] [0.359] [0.431] [0.437] [0.425] [0.430] 
atanhrho_12 
    
-1.6225 -1.6225 -1.6225 -1.6225 
     
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 
  
8,930 9,378 7,759 7,759 7,759 7,759 
Log likelihood 
  
-4427 -4383 -5840 -5840 -5854 -5854 
LR Chi2 
  
458.6 411.0 3630 3630 3602 3602 
pseudo r-squared   0.0585 0.0543 . . . . 
Standard errors in brackets ***p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Dependent variable is subjective well-being where 1=very unhappy; 2=unhappy; 3=happy; and 4=very happy 
Control variables include age, religion, ethnicity, education level, ownership of own home, use of loans in last 12 months, spousal well-being, household and community 
characteristics and social capital proxies (cooperation and security) 
Models 1 and 2 are estimated using ordered probits 
Models 3 and 4 are estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression ordered probits
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1 While it is important not to depict women as perpetual victims (Cornwall, Harrison, & Whitehead, 2007), it is 
also necessary to acknowledge that, as a group, women almost never have greater agency than men (as a 
group). This is a result of the particular patriarchal bargain within their (Kandiyoti, 1988) although there is 
evidence that doing gender (a person’s behaviour is affected by the opinions and expectations of other people 
or by social influences) constrains the behaviour of both men and women as individuals (Bertrand, Kamenica, 
& Pan, 2013; Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, & Matheson, 2003; Greenstein, 1995, 2000; Gupta, 2006; Ono & 
Raymo, 2006; Tichenor, 1999). The patriarchal bargain is not uniform and women can have different levels of 
agency within their households and societies based on seniority, piety, social class or caste or other social 
groupings such as ethnicity or sexual orientation. While men can also be constrained by social norms which 
interact with their ethnicity, sexual orientation or class (Black, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1994), women experience 
discrimination on an extra dimension compared to men – that of gender. 
 
2 These additional laws differ between male and female civil servants, compounding the disadvantage female 
civil servants already face with regards to job security and career progression (Suryakusuma, 1996). 
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3 These were the head of household and spouse, two of the household head’s children aged up to 14 years old 
who were randomly selected, someone over 50 years old and someone aged between 15 and 49 and his or her 
spouse from the remaining household members for 25% of the households sampled (Strauss et al., 2009) 
 
4There is a great deal of heterogeneity in household domestic arrangements in practice, despite the centrality 
of the idea of the nuclear family in government propaganda and policy (Nolten, 2000; Saptari, 2000). Research 
has indicated that even when families (related or otherwise) co-reside in one household, certain types of 
household decisions are typically made by each family unit independently of the other family units with 
variations between ethnic groups (Benda-Beckmann & Benda-Beckmann, 2000; Jufri & Watson, 1998; Koning, 
2000; Sanday, 2002; Schwede, 1991).  As we are primarily interested in studying the relationship between 
well-being and agency among spouses, we focus mainly on decision-making by respondents and their spouses, 
rather than the extended family.  
 
5 A version of the ordered probit model pooled across genders was considered as pooled models maximize 
efficiency through greater sample sizes. However, the ethnographic and anthropological literature on Indonesia 
indicates that a fully pooled model is inappropriate for this dataset. It is common in the subjective well-being 
literature for models to be estimated separately for men and women as there would be systematic differences 
and differences in the error term between genders. 
6 While detailed community level data was collected for IFLS enumeration areas, for households which had 
moved to non-IFLS areas, a much lighter version of community level data was collected. As such, we include 
community access to mid-wives and electricity as our community characteristics as this data was collected for 
both IFLS and non-IFLS enumeration areas. 
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7 The proportion of people who attended junior high school and beyond was much lower at 41% (Statistics 
Indonesia & Macro International, 2008). 
8 Analysis of the decision-making data collected from both men and women indicates that the responses given 
by both spouses with regards to decision-making roles and responsibilities is fairly consistent across all the 
different types of decisions which mitigates concerns of inconsistencies in the responses provided by the men 
and women in the sample (Frankenberg & Thomas, 2001). 
9 These are decisions made either wholly or jointly by parties other than the respondent and his or her spouse. 
The involvement of third parties in household decision-making depends on the type of decision in question. 
Overall, less than 10% of decisions were made by third parties, specifically, less than 1% of cash-giving or gift 
decisions, less than 2% of savings-related decisions, less than 5% of large household expenditure decisions and 
less than 10% of child-related or routine household expenditure decisions. 
 
10 We are grateful to one of our referees for bringing this interpretation of the results to our attention. 
 
11 The marginal effects associated with the estimation of Model 2 are evaluated at the mean. This reflects 
how making a particular type of household decision affects the likelihood of a person being in a category on 
the well-being scale above or below the mean of well-being. We have estimated marginal effects for Model 2 
which was our largest sample. Marginal effects for the other models are available on request. 
